A One Health approach to antimicrobial resistance surveillance: is there a business case for it? by Queenan, K et al.
  
RVC OPEN ACCESS REPOSITORY – COPYRIGHT NOTICE 
 
This is the peer-reviewed, manuscript version of the following article: 
Queenan, K., Häsler, B. and Rushton, J. (2016) 'A One Health approach to antimicrobial resistance 
surveillance: is there a business case for it?', International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents, 
48(4), 422-427. 
 
The final version is available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2016.06.014.  
         
© 2016. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. 
The full details of the published version of the article are as follows: 
 
TITLE: A One Health approach to antimicrobial resistance surveillance: is there a business 
case for it? 
AUTHORS: Kevin Queenan, Barbara Häsler, Jonathan Rushton 
JOURNAL: International Journal of Antimicrobial Agents 
PUBLISHER: Elsevier 
PUBLICATION DATE: October 2016 
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijantimicag.2016.06.014 
  
  
Title  
A One Health approach to antimicrobial resistance surveillance: Is there a business case for it? 
 
Authors 
Kevin Queenan1*, Barbara Häsler1,2, Jonathan Rushton1 
1Veterinary Epidemiology, Economics and Public Health Group, Department of Production and 
Population Health, Royal Veterinary College, Hawkshead Lane, North Mymms, Hatfield, 
Hertfordshire, AL9 7TA, United Kingdom  
2Leverhulme Centre for Integrative Research on Agriculture and Health (LCIRAH), Royal Veterinary 
College, Hawkshead Lane, North Mymms, Hatfield, Hertfordshire, AL9 7TA, United Kingdom  
*Corresponding author: email kqueenan3@rvc.ac.uk 
 
  
  
  
Abstract 
Antimicrobial resistance is a global problem of complex epidemiology, suited to a broad, integrated 
One Health approach. Resistant organisms exist in humans, animals, food and the environment and 
the main driver of this resistance is antimicrobial usage. A One Health conceptual framework for 
surveillance is presented to include all of these aspects. Global and European (regional and national) 
surveillance systems are described, highlighting shortcomings compared to the framework. Policy 
decisions rely on economic and scientific evidence so the business case for a fully integrated system 
is presented. The costs of integrated surveillance are offset by the costs of unchecked resistance and 
the benefits arising from interventions and outcomes. Current estimates focus on costs and benefits 
of human health outcomes. A One Health assessment includes wider societal costs of lost labour, 
changes of health seeking behaviour, impacts on animal health and welfare, higher costs of animal-
origin food production and reduced consumer confidence in safety and international trade of such 
food. Benefits of surveillance may take years to realise and are dependent on effective and accepted 
interventions. Benefits, including the less tangible, such as improved synergies and efficiencies in 
service delivery and more timely and accurate risk identification should also be recognised. By 
including these less tangible benefits to society, animal welfare, ecosystem health and resilience, 
together with the savings and efficiencies through shared resources and social capital building, a 
stronger business case for a One Health approach to surveillance can be made. 
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Introduction and background 
In 2001, the World Health Organisation (WHO) described antimicrobial resistance (AMR)1 as a global 
problem requiring a global response [1] but until recently it has failed to gain the urgent attention it 
deserves. Economic evidence is used as a tool to prioritise policy decisions and it has been argued 
that previous estimates of the health cost of AMR have been too negligible [2] and they have failed 
to consider the wider impacts on health care [3].  However, recently more alarming estimates of 
AMR have appeared in the literature. The European Commission claimed that costs attributed to 
resistant bacterial infections amounted to 1.5 billion EUR annually [4]. Healthcare systems in the 
USA estimate the additional cost of AMR infections to be 20 billion USD a year and productivity 
losses 35 billion USD a year [5].  The UK government commissioned “Review of AMR”, estimated that 
drug resistant infections could cause 10 million human deaths annually by 2050, with total costs by 
this date of 100 trillion USD in lost output [6].  
Disease surveillance provides evidence for informed decisions on interventions and AMR 
surveillance is no exception [7, 8]. Surveillance of AMR is critical for impact evaluation of, for 
example, interventions that change guidelines of antimicrobial usage or infection control [9]. 
Moreover, it provides information on AMR emergence and occurrence relevant for the public, 
patients, health care providers, governmental agencies and researchers [7]. 
Despite the WHO calling for local, national and global AMR surveillance systems to be established 
[8], gaps in surveillance remain, primarily through lack of capacity and integration [10]. The United 
States’ (US) National Action Plan, proposed the strengthening of a “One Health” national 
surveillance system (for humans, animals and environment) with improved international 
collaboration and capacity [11]. One Health however, also refers a broad, systems-based approach 
to complex problems [12]. It is therefore suited to AMR surveillance because it considers the 
underlying structural factors that influencing AMR, including the socio-political, material, biological 
and economic factors [13]. A One Health approach also includes an analysis of the context and 
institutional environment in which decisions are made across all levels of society [14].  
In recognition of the above, this paper proposes a framework to promote a One Health surveillance 
system for AMR. Resistance is a global concern, with no regard of national borders, degree of 
healthcare sophistication or national GDP [15]. Despite this, not all regions of the world have 
promoted integrated AMR surveillance systems. To assess the level of integration, strengths, 
challenges and weakness, literature on the current global, regional (European) and selected 
European national surveillance systems is reviewed and positioned against the proposed framework. 
Whilst the economic benefits for a One Health approach to zoonotic infectious disease surveillance 
have been published elsewhere [16-19], this paper builds a business case for a One Health approach 
to AMR surveillance.  
 
Why a One Health approach and fully integrated surveillance system? 
The discussion of AMR is often focussed on human health outcomes. However, a broader 
consideration of the impacts on animal and environmental health is essential.  Prescott (2014) [20], 
discussed the complex epidemiology of AMR and stated that “resistance anywhere is resistance 
everywhere”. AMR is described as an ecological problem by Radhouani et al. (2014) [21], and as “a 
                                                          
1 AMR, although by definition refers to resistance of all microbes including bacteria, viruses, parasites and 
fungi, this paper and the majority of the literature uses the term with a bias towards bacterial resistance. 
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highly multifaceted topic at the interface of human, animal and plant health, food hygiene and 
environmental science” by Butaye et al. (2014) [22]. 
Antimicrobial usage (more specifically antibiotics)2 and the resultant selective pressure has been 
recognised as the main driver for AMR [23, 24]. It is therefore essential to link antimicrobial usage 
data with AMR surveillance data when considering methods for AMR containment. The combined 
surveillance would also facilitate monitoring of the impact of interventions aimed to improve 
antibiotic stewardship and reduce consumption [9]. The widespread use of biocidal soaps and gels 
versus simple soap hand washing and the benefits of potentially reducing the spread institutional 
infections versus contributing to AMR is another area for consideration [25]. 
Rushton (2015) [14] stated that antimicrobials should be seen as a common good. In light of this, 
human behaviour and attitudes around antibiotic prescribing and use should be considered in both 
human and veterinary medicine. Decisions around antimicrobial usage in in livestock should consider 
the trade offs that occur between restoring animal health and productivity, provision of animal 
welfare and impacts on livelihoods, hunger and poverty alleviation, versus the risk of driving 
resistance [14]. Prescribing decisions of companion animal veterinarians are also influenced by 
affordability, ease of administration and perceived compliance [26].  The environmental impact of 
the management of human effluent, waste from livestock and aquaculture facilities and from 
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals is recognised as a potential hotspot for AMR [27].  
These aspects are yet more evidence that a broad, contextual or institutional analysis is required 
when considering the use or misuse of antimicrobials [14]. A systems based approach to surveillance 
will better identify critical control points thereby improving effectiveness and economic efficiency. 
 
One Health Framework for AMR Surveillance 
A conceptual framework for a One Health approach to AMR surveillance is proposed here and 
illustrated in Figure 1. It centralises and integrates surveillance of both antibiotic usage or 
consumption for humans and animals, with AMR data from humans, animals, food and the 
environment.  
                                                          
2 In the context of usage, the literature’s focus has been on antibiotics and impact on resistance in bacteria. 
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Figure 1: An interconnected and integrated One Health surveillance framework that puts at its 
centre antimicrobial resistance and antimicrobial consumption 
 
Consumption data in humans is gathered in hospital and community settings, whilst in animals it is 
gathered at the species level i.e. food producing animals (including fish), companion animals and 
wildlife. AMR surveillance in humans includes invasive sampling of clinical cases from hospital and 
community care settings as well as non-invasive sampling of commensals. In food producing animals, 
isolates are accessed from clinical cases and commensals from healthy animals (available at 
slaughter). Similarly, samples of clinical cases in companion animals and wildlife are easily accessed 
through veterinarians, although commensals from both groups, especially wildlife may be less 
feasible. Surveillance of AMR in organisms isolated from food, includes food originating from animals 
and plants (zoonotic pathogen surveillance from the former and commensals from both). 
Environmental surveillance includes samples from water sources and soil. 
Data collected within the various categories requires an integrated analysis, facilitated by teams with 
experience across the sectors. Similarly, interpretation of the analysis requires teams of sectoral 
experts who also possess inter-sectoral knowledge and understanding and the collaborative skills to 
work with those from other sectors, including social scientists and behaviour change experts. This is 
to ensure a One Health approach to developing the subsequent recommendations.  
A centralised programme is required to set standards for data collection, which is critical at all levels 
for ease of analysis and interpretation. This will also improve communication and networking 
between disciplines and sectors through shared meetings, discussions and report editing. 
Centralised leadership and budgeting will be responsible for supporting and enabling peripheral 
capacity and compliance. However, this ideal, multi-dimensional, integrated surveillance may be 
difficult to achieve across all categories given the high level of capacity and logistics required and the 
commonly found barriers between siloed institutions. A tiered approach to integration may assist in 
building capacity. Within each tier, globally recognised techniques and standards must be adopted 
and adhered to. The initial tier would involve relatively standard collection, sharing and analysis of 
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data and therefore involve less integrated interpretation. The progression into the higher tiers would 
involve broadening data collection sources (from Figure 1). This would require a shift in institutional 
mind-sets to support the increasing degrees of co-operation and integration required to facilitate 
the analysis and interpretation of results and evolution of joint recommendations. 
 
A review of current surveillance systems, from global to local 
A review of the current global and European (regional and national) surveillance systems was 
conducted to identify degrees of integration, with attention to AMR and usage data, sectoral 
integration, which species and which food types and environmental elements were included in 
sampling.  
1. Global Systems 
The 2008 WHO Advisory Group on Integrated Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance (AGISAR), has 
31 internationally renowned expert advisors including representatives from the World Organisation 
for Animal Health (OIE) and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Their aims include 
developing standardised sampling techniques and methodology, providing expert advice, promoting 
information sharing and supporting capacity building for AMR surveillance and antimicrobial usage 
in member states. 
The Global Foodborne Infections Network (GFN) has public health, veterinary and food-sector 
professionals, all working towards a global integrated AMR surveillance system.  
Codex Alimentarius (commissioned by WHO and FAO) includes a task force to integrate AMR 
surveillance in humans with that in food producing animals, crops and food. 
WHONET is a WHO initiative to support harmonisation of global surveillance data by providing free 
software and training to laboratories in over 100 countries within all six WHO regions. The software 
facilitates standardised data collection and analysis and also informal sharing and networking.  
The Transatlantic Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance (TATFAR) was established in 2009 as a 
collaboration between the US and the EU. It aims to promote appropriate use of antimicrobials in 
human and veterinary medicine, prevent resistant infections in hospital and communities and 
improve development of new antimicrobials.  
The Joint Programming Initiative on AMR (JPIAMR) is a research group which co-ordinates global 
research in AMR. Their One Health research agenda includes AMR in humans, animals and the 
environment. 
2. Regional (European) Systems 
The European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) conducts surveillance for AMR and antibiotic 
consumption in human health through several networks. 
 The European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance Network (EARS-Net) provides guidance 
to members on data collection, management, analysis and validation. It collates data from 
over 900 public health laboratories, which process samples from clinical cases in over 1,400 
hospitals in 30 EU/EEA countries.  
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 The European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Consumption Network (ESAC-Net) collates data 
on systemic use of antibiotics, antifungals and antivirals in hospital and community sectors 
from 32 EU/EEA countries. 
 The European Food and Waterborne Diseases and Zoonoses Network (FWD-Net) is 
responsible for surveillance of human pathogens from water, food or animal contact. The 
data contributes to the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) and ECDC annual summary 
report. 
 The Healthcare Associated Infection Network (HAI-Net) coordinates AMR surveillance and 
antimicrobial use in acute (intensive care) and long term care facilities and the surveillance 
of surgical site infections 
 
Surveillance of AMR in food producing animals and food products and veterinary antibiotic 
consumption are covered by the following: 
 The European Centre for the study of Animal Health (CEESA) collects standardised AMR data 
for a central laboratory, from healthy animals at slaughter and clinically ill food producing 
and companion animals.  
 The European Surveillance of Veterinary Antimicrobial Consumption (ESVAC) aims to collect 
harmonised data on the sales of veterinary antimicrobials (from wholesalers, veterinarians 
and pharmacies) so as to enable comparison with human consumption data. Its 4th annual 
report [28] included data from approximately 95% of food producing animals in 26 EU/EEA 
countries.  
 The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) collates AMR data within its surveillance of 
zoonoses and disease outbreaks from food and food producing animals. It supports EU 
members, providing guidelines on standardising sampling and processing, so as to 
harmonise data for analysis. It produces an annual summary report in conjunction with the 
ECDC. 
 
In addition, the ECDC facilitates collaboration of surveillance groups with the European Committee 
on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing (EUCAST) and the European Society of Clinical Microbiology 
and Infectious Diseases (ESCMID). ESCMID has been active for over 25 years, with a wide range of 
study groups, some concerned with specific disease agents and others covering antimicrobial policy 
(ESGAP), antimicrobial resistance surveillance (ESGARS) and veterinary microbiology (ESGVM). 
In 2012, building on the success of the ECDC programs, EARS-Net was expanded and the Central Asia 
and European Surveillance of Antimicrobial Resistance Network (CAESAR) was established.  
 
3. National systems 
The WHO’s Global Report on Surveillance of AMR [10], is based on data from the 129 contributing 
member states. The report highlighted individual national systems which attempt to integrate 
surveillance in humans, food producing animals and food. (Table 1). 
Table 1: Antimicrobial resistance surveillance systems [10]  
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CIPARS  
Canada 
X X   X X X X X X 
DANMAP 
Denmark 
X X X X X X X X X X 
FINRES-VET 
Finland 
X X X  X X X X X X 
GERM-VET 
Germany 
 X    X  X X X 
ITAVARM 
Italy 
X X X  X X  X X X 
JVARM 
Japan 
  X   X X X X  
NARMS 
United States 
X  X  X X X X X X 
NETHMAP/MARAN 
Netherlands 
X X   X X X X X X 
NORM/NORMVET 
Norway 
X X X  X X X X X X 
ONERBA 
France 
X X X  X X X X X X 
SWEDRES/SVARM 
Sweden 
X X X  X X X X X X 
 
Several national systems within EU states have been guided towards integration through the 
direction of the European regional systems as mentioned in the previous section. Longstanding 
examples include the following: 
i. The Danish Integrated Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring and Research Program 
(DANMAP) was established in 1995 as a collaborative programme between the Ministry of 
Health and the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Fisheries. DANMAP has implemented a 
“farm to fork to sickbed” approach to surveillance [29] to include the whole supply chain.  
Sampling includes human and animal clinical cases, healthy animals (randomly at slaughter) 
and locally produced and imported meat products at wholesale and retail outlets. 
Consumption data is collected from hospitals, primary health care centres and from 
pharmacies. Veterinary medicine usage is registered at a species level (food producing 
animals (including fish), and companion animals) by veterinarians, pharmacies and feed 
mills. 
ii. The Swedish Strategic Programme Against Antibiotic Resistance (STRAMA), founded in 1995, 
aims to preserve antimicrobial agent effectiveness in public health. The Swedish Veterinary 
Antimicrobial Resistance Monitoring Programme (SVARM) was established in 2000. STRAMA 
has produced an annual report (SWEDRES) on antibiotic use and resistance in humans since 
2001, whilst SVARM’s annual report covered AMR surveillance in zoonotic bacteria, specific 
animal pathogens, commensal enteric bacteria and bacteria from food of animal origin. 
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Since 2011, a combined, integrated SWEDRES/SVARM annual report has been published, 
demonstrating inter-sectorial collaboration. 
iii. The Netherlands has, since 2003 produced NethMap, an annual report on AMR and 
antibiotic consumption trends in humans. MARAN, the veterinary surveillance system, has 
done the same for food producing animals and also includes isolates from vegetables, fruits 
and herbs. Since 2012 a single, combined (NethMap-MARAN) report has been published. 
 
Challenges and shortcomings, recent developments and future improvements 
The review demonstrates evidence of broader sampling, integration and shared analysis, however, 
thus far no fully integrated and standardised surveillance system for AMR and antimicrobial usage, 
which functions both locally and globally, exists. A lack of data quantity and quality persists, the 
latter affected by a lack of standardisation [30]. There is still insufficient comparable data of AMR in 
humans and livestock to develop global mapping of resistance and allow accurate comparisons 
between humans, various livestock species, industries, countries or regions [31].  
In 2012 the WHO published results of a survey of existing surveillance networks [32]. Five 
international and 22 national networks responded. Only 30% had a nationally coordinated body, 
whilst less than 40% had formal quality assurance requirements whilst antimicrobial usage data was 
generally absent. In the WHO’s Global Report on Surveillance of AMR [10], there was no formal 
consensus on methodology and data collection among the 129 contributing member states. At the 
European level, although EARS-Net advises and encourages standardisation using EUCAST guidelines, 
only 64% of the participating laboratories do so [23]. Global systems are reliant on data collected 
nationally. Therefore, standards within data collection need to be applied at source to allow 
meaningful interpretation at all levels, which will require significant investment in developing 
capacity. Therefore, in the next section we discuss a business case for a One Health approach to 
AMR surveillance.  
 
The business case for a One Health approach to AMR surveillance 
Whilst Babo Martins et al. (2015) [19] provided a framework for a broad economic assessment of 
integrated zoonotic disease surveillance in a One Health context, publications showing direct 
measureable impacts of AMR surveillance and interventions from a One Health perspective were not 
found. Similarities exist between the business case for AMR surveillance and of emerging zoonotic 
infectious diseases. In both cases their unpredictable nature makes economic evaluation dependant 
on assumptions and/or predictive modelling, which are often subject to considerable uncertainty. 
Appreciating the broad complexity and interconnectivity of human, animal and environmental 
outcomes, a One Health, systems-thinking approach is needed to measure the benefits of 
investment in integrated surveillance. Evaluation of economic and empirical scientific aspects must 
be blended with an appreciation of the social, cultural and ecological aspects [33]; the less tangible 
and non-monetary outcomes should be considered in addition to the monetary. These less tangible 
benefits include knowledge creation, social and intellectual capital, reduced anxiety, political 
reassurance and technical capacity building. Whilst these not always easily quantifiable, they should 
be considered nonetheless [19].  
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Table 2 summarises the costs and benefits envisaged from integrating surveillance of AMR to a One 
Health level and also the costs and benefits of the integrated interventions arising from the One 
Health surveillance.   
Table 2: Summary of costs and benefits of One Health AMR surveillance and resultant 
interventions 
Integrating AMR Surveillance to a One Health level 
Costs Benefits 
1. Costs of design and setup including time to agree on 
common goals, new roles and duties, dispersal of funding 
and resolving issues of conflict. 
2. Costs of training staff in interdisciplinary work. 
3. Costs of additional staff, expert consultants, joint 
consultations and meetings. 
4. Costs of collating additional data and joint analysis and 
communication of results. 
5. Additional costs for extending the breadth and depth of 
coverage of surveillance. 
1. Improved service delivery 
2. Improved efficiency by sharing scarce resources or 
better use of underutilised resources. 
3. Social capital gains through sharing skillsets and 
networking. 
4. Improved synergies between empirical, social, 
environmental and ecological sciences. 
5. Enriched and more efficient research outcomes.  
6. More timely and accurate identification of risks through 
broader surveillance and integration. 
7. Improved, more timely and efficient interventions 
based on improved risk assessments. 
 
Integrated interventions arising from One Health Surveillance 
Costs Benefits 
1. Increased costs of wider interventions across human 
and animal health and the environmental sectors. 
2. Potential increased costs of livestock production 
through use of improved biosecurity in contrast to 
prophylactic use of antibiotics. 
1. Broader benefits across sectors arising from a systems 
approach vs. narrow reactionary solutions. 
2. Improved and broader valuation of benefits by 
including intangible societal and environmental benefits. 
3. Reduced health care costs (prevention of longer 
hospitalisation, more expensive drugs, intensive infection 
control measures etc.) 
4. Decreased morbidity and mortality. 
5. Prevention of reduced workforce productivity due to 
prolonged recovery or caring for relatives. 
6. Prevention of costs of litigation against hospital and 
staff. 
7. Prevention of lost income through reduced cross 
border travel and tourist income, and from reduced trade 
in live animals and food of animal origin. 
8. Reduced cost of animal health care and infection 
control in food producing animal systems. 
9. Prevention of increased cost in foodstuffs from animal 
origin. 
10. Improved consumer confidence in food safety. 
11. Improved ecosystem resilience. 
 
 
Although costs are incurred in the setup of or conversion into a One Health system, savings are 
expected from the effects of shared and more efficient use of resources, shared running costs and 
improved outcomes. Using the H5N1 (HPAI) campaign as an example, the World Bank estimated cost 
savings of 10-30% from joint investment and 20-40% in costs of ongoing surveillance through shared 
staff and facilities. Further savings in training and research are estimated at 5-10% [34].  
Surveillance benefits primarily relate to those arising from the interventions it spawns.  Interventions 
are often delayed whilst sufficient data is collected and analysed. Benefits may not be immediate 
(e.g. the impact on public health outcomes from reduced antimicrobial use) and may also be 
confounded by several factors over time [35]. Global travel is an example; despite Denmark’s 
attempts to control resistance in Campylobacter, 37% of campylobacteriosis cases in humans were 
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related to international travel, with a higher proportion of these being resistant compared to 
domestic cases [29].  
Positive knock-on effects also need to be recognised. Denmark’s integration of antimicrobial 
consumption data with resistance data, identified specific links, resulting in improved public 
awareness and government policy [36], which included a ban of the use of certain antibiotics in 
livestock and restrictions on veterinarians’ profits from antibiotic sales [37]. In addition, a voluntary 
ban against using cephalosporins and fluoroquinolones in food producing animals followed. As a 
result, food producing animals in Denmark consume 80% less antimicrobials per kg of meat 
produced that those in the USA [37]. 
A greater understanding is required of the wider implications and costs of AMR on society. 
Implications include changes in health seeking behaviour e.g. avoiding invasive procedures because 
of the (perceived) risk of untreatable infections [2], increased hospital infection control measures, 
litigation and reduced international travel and trade [38]. Furthermore, reports on the costs of 
unchecked AMR fail to consider the impact on the food producing animal sector and the effect on 
livestock dependent communities and national economies. The costs of untreatable livestock 
diseases, increased biosecurity costs and the costs of lost consumer confidence in the safety of food 
of animal origin as well as animal welfare issues need to be included.  
 
Discussion 
Recent calls to improve the integration of AMR and consumption surveillance are welcomed. This 
complex, interconnected problem with negative externalities will require international inter-sectoral 
collaboration. It therefore favours the application of a One Health approach to the surveillance 
systems, the interventions and the evaluation of outcomes.  
The European national surveillance systems reviewed in this paper all fall short of the One Health 
framework presented above, with none mentioning the environment or wildlife. DANMAP is the 
only national system to include commensals from healthy humans but lacks data from companion 
animals. The Netherlands has extended its surveillance in foodborne microbes to include non-animal 
origin foodstuffs. 
The recommendations for a One Health approach at a global level by JPIAMR, the White House and 
WHO will hopefully influence those national systems committed to being part of the global system. 
The significant challenge to build capacity at local and national levels persists. Modern technology 
may hold some solutions to data management but using high tech systems in remote, 
underdeveloped regions may be difficult. Yet developing countries will potentially have the greatest 
influence on the future of AMR. Global investment is needed for capacity building to improve the 
control of hospital infections, control antimicrobial usage in food producing animals and control the 
sale of antibiotics without prescription and counterfeit drugs [39,40]. The inclusion of their 
surveillance data is therefore crucial. 
The Who identified data quality as the major shortcoming of existing systems. Without standardised 
laboratory techniques and reconcilable data, meaningful analysis and constructive interventions will 
fall short of expectations. Once laboratory standards and methods of data recording are agreed on, 
the surveillance systems should develop and extend to incorporate as much of the One Health 
framework as possible, with increasing degrees of integration. 
Conclusion 
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As the increase in antimicrobial resistance continues and fewer new drugs are being developed, calls 
for action to avert the impending crisis of a “post antibiotic era” are being heard. To promote 
effectiveness and economic efficiency, interventions need to be designed from sound evidence 
gained from surveillance. A broad One Health approach to the evidence gathering surveillance, data 
analysis, intervention design and evaluation is proposed. Given the scale of the problem and the 
expected socio-economic costs, the additional monetary, social and time investments are likely to be 
recovered by the resulting benefits, which include quantifiable financial efficiencies and improved 
human and animal health outcomes. In addition, if one looks broadly and includes the less tangible 
benefits to society (open trade and travel), animal welfare, ecosystem health and environmental 
resilience, then the business case for a One Health approach to AMR surveillance is strengthened.  
Based on the framework presented in this paper, the development of a One Health surveillance 
system is called for. Its foundation must be based on standard laboratory techniques and data 
management, which can be integrated, compared and interpreted at all levels. This will require 
global and local governance to work together. Widening the scope of surveillance to include all 
aspects within the proposed framework can be built on this foundation over time but may require a 
shift in institutional mind-sets. 
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